Methods, systems, articles of manufacture and apparatus for producing generic IP reputation through cross-protocol analysis
Combining signals across different network protocols into a single, protocol-agnostic IP reputation score that is harder for attackers to poison than any single-source list.
Most IP reputation systems in production security look at one channel at a time: an IP is judged bad because it sent spam, or because it hosted phishing, or because it appeared in a malware sinkhole. Attackers exploit that silo — they burn the channel that got them flagged and pivot to a new one where their reputation is still clean. This work brings the channels together. Telemetry from separate protocols is normalized, correlated, and combined into a single reputation score that reflects everything the network is doing, not just one facet of it. In practice that means an IP has to earn a clean reputation across all the ways it shows up, not just the ones a defender happens to be watching, which raises the operational cost of the attacker's pivot. The impact for customers is fewer false positives (a benign mail server does not get slandered by an unrelated port scan) and fewer false negatives (a machine cleaning up its spam behavior while quietly hosting a C2 no longer looks clean). Underlying much of my published IP and domain reputation work at McAfee and Intel.